What is the relationship between Cheney and Iran?
In a March 20, 2007 New York Times column, Nicholas Kristof describes the VP as “Iran’s Operative in the White House.”
Is Dick Cheney an Iranian mole?
Consider that the Bush administration’s first major military intervention was to overthrow Afghanistan’s Taliban regime, Iran’s bitter foe to the east. Then the administration toppled Iran’s even worse enemy to the west, the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq.
You really think that’s just a coincidence? That of all 193 nations in the world, we just happen to topple the two neighboring regimes that Iran despises?
Moreover, consider how our invasion of Iraq went down. The U.S. dismantled Iraq’s army, broke the Baath Party and helped install a pro-Iranian government in Baghdad. If Iran’s ayatollahs had written the script, they couldn’t have done better — so maybe they did write the script …
We fought Iraq, and Iran won. And that’s just another coincidence?
Kristof, it seems, is joking.
O.K., O.K. Of course, all this is absurd. Mr. Cheney isn’t an Iranian mole…
Mr. Cheney harmed American interests not out of malice but out of ineptitude. I concede that they honestly wanted the best for America, but we still ended up getting the worst.
I have no problem stipulating a lot of ineptitude in the Bush administration, starting at the top. But I have also warned–in my essay, “Beyond Incompetence: Washington’s War in Iraq“–that the simplistic charge of ineptitude can lead one to underestimate opponents. This is almost certainly the case when thinking about Cheney and geopolitical strategy.
So, without suggesting that there is any transparency about Cheney’s current thinking about Iran, it might be worth recalling that Cheney was not always an Iran hawk, especially when it came to thinking about Russia and the Caspian Sea.
Dick Cheney, chief executive officer of Dallas-based Halliburton Co. and former U.S. defense secretary, argued Wednesday the U.S. policy toward Iran hampers another American effort, to encourage Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and the other countries in the Caspian region to act independently of Moscow.
“Policies against Iran interfere with our policy of independence for the Caspian nations,” Cheney said. (“U.S. moves to foil Iran pipeline; Kazakhs seek loans for alternate routes,” The Houston Chronicle, November 20, 1997, p.2)
A lot has changed since then. Among other things, Cheney’s potential overtures to Iran in 2000 were blocked by the Israel lobby in the US Congress.
But Cheney has certainly not lost his focus the urgency of “our policy of independence for the Caspian nations.” Some of that has meant working mightily to construct energy pipelines that bypass Russia and Iran. But some of it has also meant preparing the way–one way or another–for a new dawn in US-Iranian relations, all at the expense of Russian influence in the Caspian.
Indeed, according to Cheney’s own calendar, the time is coming near:
“I think we’d be better off if we in fact backed off those [Iran] sanctions . . . didn’t try to impose secondary boycotts on [Australian] companies like BHP trying to do business over there,” he told the Business Sunday program.
For several years BHP has been discussing a 2400km natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Iran to Turkey but has been reluctant to commit to the project for fear of US reprisals…
“I think the [hawkish] Iranian policy the US is following is also inappropriate, frankly,” he said.
“I think we ought to begin to work to rebuild those relationships with Iran . . . it may take 10 years but it’s important that we do that.” (“BHP pipeline should not face US sanctions, says Cheney,” The Australian, April 20, 1998, p.35.)
It may take ten years. Hmmm. That gives him until April 20, 2008. Mark your calendars.