{"id":128,"date":"2006-09-07T07:11:42","date_gmt":"2006-09-07T11:11:42","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=128"},"modified":"2007-02-27T22:16:19","modified_gmt":"2007-02-28T03:16:19","slug":"afghanistan-the-salad-days","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=128","title":{"rendered":"Afghanistan: The Salad Days"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>It will be tempting for critics of the Bush administration to read news of a new <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/news.bbc.co.uk\/2\/hi\/south_asia\/5315564.stm\">peace treaty between Taliban forces and the Pakistani government<\/a> as one more way to criticize the war in Iraq.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;See?&#8230; We were <em>supposed<\/em> to be fighting the <em>actual<\/em> war on terror.  But we didn&#8217;t.  Instead we were distracted by a cabal of Neoconservatives into fighting the <em>wrong war<\/em> in Iraq.  Now, our <em>real enemies<\/em> are on the rise again in Afghanistan and Pakistan.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>(Has somebody already said all this?  Probably.  The &#8220;quote&#8221; above is hypothetical, but  I would welcome any links).<\/p>\n<p>There are both dangers and errors in this tempting line of criticism.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Danger, Will Robinson&#8230; <\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The danger, for the Left, is in trying to hit the Bush administration <em>from its Right<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>File this under &#8220;Careful What you Wish&#8221; (CWW for the IM crowd?).<\/p>\n<p>Do you <em>really<\/em> want to be more hawkish than this administration?  Or is this simply about demonstrating Bush administration hypocrisy?<\/p>\n<p>Do you really prefer a <em>consistent<\/em> Bush administration that <em>actually<\/em> stays the course in its Global War on Terror?<\/p>\n<p>Some may very well answer, Yes.  Such hawks should not hide behind the softer charge of hypocrisy so they can &#8220;hang&#8221; with the groovy anti-war crowd.<\/p>\n<p>For those who answer, No, it might make more sense to understand <em>why<\/em> the Bush administration has let Afghanistan slip.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Remembering Factionalism: The Salad Days<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>With the upcoming anniversary of 9\/11, let&#8217;s take a stroll down memory lane back to the early days of the War on Terror.<\/p>\n<p>There is a tendency to think of Afghanistan as the &#8220;consensus&#8221; war and Iraq as the source of discord.  Not so within the Bush administration.<\/p>\n<p>Factionalism after 9\/11 did not start because some in the administration wanted to talk about Iraq.  It started with Afghanistan.<\/p>\n<p>Recall, for example, a Willliam Kristol <em>Washington Post<\/em> Op-Ed entitled &#8220;<a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.newamericancentury.org\/bushpowell-092501.htm\">Bush vs. Powell<\/a>,&#8221; archived on the website of the Project for a New American Century.<\/p>\n<p>It is a great opening salvo in the factional war between Right Zionists like Kristol and Right Arabists like Secretary of State Colin Powell.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The president devoted          a good chunk of his speech to an indictment of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan:          &#8220;In Afghanistan we see al Qaeda&#8217;s vision for the world. Afghanistan&#8217;s          people have been brutalized . . . we condemn the Taliban regime.&#8221;          Further: &#8220;By aiding and abetting murder the Taliban regime is committing          murder.&#8221;&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>On Sunday, by contrast,          the secretary of state drew a distinction between al Qaeda and the Taliban,          and more or less dismissed concerns about the Taliban: &#8220;With respect          to the nature of the regime in Afghanistan, that is not uppermost in our          minds right now. . . . I&#8217;m not going to say that it has become one of          the objectives of the United States government to either remove or put          in place a different regime.&#8221;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>At the time, it might have seemed like Powell was simply playing the anti-war dove.  Maybe.  But there were also regional strategic issues involved.<\/p>\n<p>The Taliban was a product of the Pakistanis.  The Pakistanis were closely aligned with the Saudis.  Right Arabists were not prepared to break any of these ties.<\/p>\n<p>By contrast the &#8220;Northern Alliance&#8221; (remember them?) were aligned with Iran and India.  And India was closely aligned with Israel.  And Iran was once Israel&#8217;s best friend in the region.  Right Zionists wanted to topple the Taliban as the first step in a regional re-alignment that would ultimately break the alliance between the US and the Saudis.<\/p>\n<p>Kristol (with Robert Kagan) wrote a follow-up on the factional battle over Afghanistan in a November 26, 2001 <em>Weekly Standard<\/em> article entitled &#8220;A Winning Strategy.&#8221;<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The original strategy, promoted especially by State Department officials under Secretary of State Colin Powell, in cooperation with the CIA, was unenthusiastic about too rapid a military advance by the Northern Alliance against Taliban positions in the north and around Kabul, and was therefore not designed to aid such an advance.<br class=\"br\" \/><br class=\"br\" \/>From the very outset, even before the bombing began on October 7, there was a fundamental disagreement between the Pentagon and the State Department over how to manage the situation in Afghanistan.  On September 26, the <em>Washington Post<\/em> reported an &#8220;ongoing debate&#8221; between the State Department and the Pentagon over the objective. Pentagon officials wanted to &#8220;ensure that the campaign ends with the ouster of the Taliban.&#8221; But State Department officials argued the administration should &#8220;be cautious and focus on bin Laden and his al Qaeda network.&#8221; Secretary Powell was reluctant to make the overthrow of the Taliban the stated objective of the war.<br class=\"br\" \/><br class=\"br\" \/>The State Department&#8217;s position reflected concern for the sensitivities of the Pakistani government and its nervous president, General Pervez Musharraf. Pakistan had long supported the Taliban, and the government wanted a guarantee that some Taliban elements would have a share in any postwar government. The Pakistanis were also acutely hostile to the Northern Alliance and wanted to make sure that it would be kept out of a new government or would have at most a minimal role&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>[T]he State Department pursued what became known as the &#8220;southern strategy.&#8221; State Department and CIA officials worked arduously to put together a Pashtun coalition acceptable to Pakistan. In the process, attempting to sweeten the pot, the State Department made a significant compromise regarding the future role of the Taliban. Secretary Powell, meeting with President Musharraf in the second week of October, agreed with the Pakistani president that &#8220;moderate&#8221; Taliban members might be able &#8220;to participate in developing a new Afghanistan.&#8221;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>This is the background story of factionalism that led us to the current moment in Afghanistan and Pakistan.<\/p>\n<p>Those who want to use the fact of a resurgent Taliban to whip the neocons for their war in Iraq should be very clear: you are playing on their home turf.<\/p>\n<p>The Right Zionists would be the first&#8211;indeed, they <em>were<\/em> the first&#8211;to criticize Right Arabist compromises with Musharraf and the Taliban.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>It will be tempting for critics of the Bush administration to read news of a new peace treaty between Taliban forces and the Pakistani government as one more way to criticize the war in Iraq. &#8220;See?&#8230; We were supposed to be fighting the actual war on terror. But we didn&#8217;t. Instead we were distracted by [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[16,3,17,10,11],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/128"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=128"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/128\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=128"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=128"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=128"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}