Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has been fighting an insurgency from within the ranks of the US Army.<\/p>\n
Lately, however, Rumsfeld has been taking some “friendly fire” from some of his closest allies in that fight, especially his hand-picked Army Chief of Staff, General Peter Schoomaker.<\/p>\n
Background: the Revolt of the Generals<\/strong><\/p>\n The “revolt of the Generals” is not a recent phenomenon and isn’t only about policies specific to Iraq.<\/p>\n The Pentagon insurgency began before<\/em> September 11th and long before the invasion of Iraq. If we are allowed to ask of these “dead enders” why they hate him, the central grievance is clear enough:<\/p>\n Rumsfeld is, among other things, a “military transformation” guy who favors technological innovations that give air power and special ops–rather than traditional Army “boots on the ground”–central stage in military planning.<\/p>\n Much of this is well documented in a book by Washington Times<\/em> military correspondent Rowan Scarborough in his 2004 book, Rumsfeld’s War<\/em><\/a>. The chapter-section called “Guerrilla Warfare” that discusses the development of an “anti-Rumsfeld insurgency” in the Pentagon covers the period before<\/em> September 11th.<\/p>\n After September 11th, Rumsfeld used his new-found influence to pursue a relentless counter-insurgency<\/em> campaign against his Pentagon critics. Well-known casualties include former Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki.<\/p>\n Shinseki made the traditional case for the primarcy of Army boots on the ground–as a matter of general strategic planning, more specifically, in the case of Iraq.<\/p>\n Shinseki was publicly rebuked by Rumsfeld Deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, and when Shinseki “retired,” Rumsfeld appointed a “Special Forces” guy<\/em>–General Schoomaker–as Army Chief<\/a>. First time ever. Rumsfeld was obviously looking for a loyal military transformationalist.<\/p>\n Schoomaker, Embedded<\/strong><\/p>\n Fast forward to the Annual Convention of the “Association of the U.S. Army<\/a>,” currently underway in Washington.<\/p>\n On Wednesday (October 11, 2006), General Schoomaker spoke to the Army Association. C-Span covered the event (no link at this time; the video is not yet up on the C-Span website).<\/p>\n Schoomaker began his remarks by recognizing various notables in the audience. Top billing went to (Retired) General Eric Shinseki.<\/p>\n I don’t know much about Army protocol, so I wasn’t sure if this was unusual or meaningful. But the applause generated by the name Shinseki was undeniably meaningful.<\/p>\n It soon became clear that Schoomaker was<\/em> intentionally sending a message with his nod to Shinseki.<\/p>\n Has Schoomaker joined the insurgency?<\/p>\n His central critique is actually the same one articulated by “liberal hawks”: the Bush administration has failed to cultivate the “political culture of sacrifice<\/a>” required for war.<\/p>\n I cannot yet find a full-text, on-line transcript of the speech. But the Army Association website<\/a> does include some key passages.<\/p>\n The nation has had a \u00e2\u20ac\u0153tepid\u00e2\u20ac\u009d response to the war against global terrorism, Army Chief of Staff Peter Schoomaker said Oct. 10, arguing that the country needs to make both a financial and spiritual commitment to the ongoing struggle.<\/p>\n Schoomaker, addressing the Annual Meeting of the Association of the United States Army, sharply contrasted the post-9\/11 civilian reaction with the mobilization<\/strong> and grand consensus \u00e2\u20ac\u201c and financial support<\/strong> — that emerged during the Second World War and Cold War<\/strong>.<\/p>\n \u00e2\u20ac\u0153In many ways, the nation\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s response to war has been tepid<\/strong>,\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Schoomaker said.<\/p>\n Schoomaker warned that \u00e2\u20ac\u0153we are much closer to the beginning than the end of this long conflict.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d<\/p>\n In order to successfully reach the end of the conflict, the military will require renewed public support, both in terms of dollars and political leadership, Schoomaker said.<\/p>\n \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Ultimately victory requires a national strategic consensus, evident in both words and actions,\u00e2\u20ac\u009d he said. \u00e2\u20ac\u0153While such a common strategic foundation, understood and accepted by the American people<\/strong>, existed during the Cold War, in the form of our strategy of containment, it is not yet evident<\/strong> that such common understanding exists today. \u00e2\u20ac\u00a6 Another 9\/11 should not have to occur to shake us into action\u00e2\u20ac\u009d…<\/p>\n Schoomaker pointedly compared U.S. defense spending during the Second World War with the current outlays. During that war, the defense budget reached 38 percent of the gross domestic product, as compared with more 14 percent during the Korean War, and roughly 10 percent during the Vietnam War. Current military outlays are at less than 4 percent, Schoomaker said.<\/p>\n \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Let there be no mistake: Our soldiers\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 effectiveness in battle, both today and tomorrow, ultimately depends on a national commitment to recruit, train, equip and support them and their families properly<\/strong>,\u00e2\u20ac\u009d he said. \u00e2\u20ac\u0153This is a matter of national priorities, not a matter of affordability.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Of course, the aim here is to rally for more DoD and, specifically, Army funding. Nothing surprising in that. Just the “military-industrial complex” talking, some folks might say.<\/p>\n