{"id":213,"date":"2006-12-19T10:45:56","date_gmt":"2006-12-19T15:45:56","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=213"},"modified":"2007-02-27T22:03:55","modified_gmt":"2007-02-28T03:03:55","slug":"flynt-sets-a-fire","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=213","title":{"rendered":"Flynt Sets a Fire"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><meta http-equiv=\"Content-Language\" content=\"en-us\" \/> <meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text\/html; charset=windows-1252\" \/><title>Flynt Leverett<\/title>Flynt Leverett&#8217;s views on US policy toward Iran are making news.<\/p>\n<p>Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett&#8211;both former NSC staff member in the  Bush administration&#8211;co-authored a <em>New York Times<\/em> Op-Ed calling for a  &#8220;Grand Bargain&#8221; with Iran.\u00c2\u00a0 According to the <em> <a href=\"http:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/wp-dyn\/content\/article\/2006\/12\/18\/AR2006121800974.html\"> Washington Post<\/a>,<\/em> the CIA&#8211;under pressure from the White House&#8211;&#8220;ordered  two sections concerning U.S. dealings with Iran in his article to be heavily  redacted.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>As the <em>Post<\/em> reports, &#8220;As a former CIA official, Leverett is required  to submit his writings for pre-publication review.&#8221;\u00c2\u00a0 The controversy  concerns <em>White House pressure<\/em> on the CIA, especially since the agency had  already approved publication of a longer version of the article, &#8220;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.tcf.org\/list.asp?type=PB&#038;pubid=595\">Dealing  with Tehran: Assessing U.S. Diplomatic Options toward Iran<\/a>,&#8221; written for the  Century Foundation.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.guardian.co.uk\/comment\/story\/0,3604,1084880,00.html\"> Previous reports<\/a> suggested that Flynt Leverett was essentially &#8220;purged&#8221; from  the NSC as part of a factional battle with <a href=\"http:\/\/www.msnbc.msn.com\/id\/15896208\/site\/newsweek\/\">Elliott Abrams<\/a>&#8211;a  key <a href=\"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=123\">Right Zionist<\/a> in  the Bush administration.<\/p>\n<p>Leverett&#8217;s subsequent attacks on the Neocons transformed this establishment  Right Arabist into a <a href=\"http:\/\/www.democracynow.org\/article.pl?sid=04\/04\/02\/1516227\">darling of  the anti-war Left<\/a>.\u00c2\u00a0 The latest White House move against Leverett only  enhances his &#8220;street cred.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>What does Leverett&#8217;s Century Foundation propose for US-Iran relations?\u00c2\u00a0  What got him into trouble with the White House?\u00c2\u00a0 And who are his key  opponents?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Leverett&#8217;s Grand Bargain<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Leverett is as clear as any Right Arabist that, from his perspective, the  Iranian regime is waiting for <em>one basic concession<\/em> from the US as the  price for cooperation on the nuclear issue, Iraq, etc.: a security guarantee.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Tehran will require, among other things, a security guarantee from  \tWashington\u00e2\u20ac\u201deffectively <strong>a commitment that the United States will not use  \tforce to change the borders or form of government of the Islamic Republic of  \tIran<\/strong>\u00e2\u20ac\u201dbolstered by the prospect of a lifting of U.S. unilateral sanctions and  \tnormalization of bilateral relations.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>According to Leverett, the Iranians are holding out for this all-important US  guarantee.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>[I]t is interesting to note an important difference between the  \tincentives package presented to Iran by the Europeans in August 2005 and the  \tpackage presented to Tehran by the P-5 and Germany in June 2006&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>[T]he <strong>August 2005 package<\/strong> contained a number of prospective  \tcommitments amounting to an <strong>effective security guarantee<\/strong> for the  \tIslamic Republic; because these prospective commitments <strong>came only from  \tEurope<\/strong>, they were <strong>strategically meaningless<\/strong> from an Iranian  \tperspective.<\/p>\n<p>By contrast, the <strong>June 2006 package<\/strong>, which was <strong>endorsed by the  \tBush administration<\/strong>, contained <strong>no prospective security guarantees<\/strong>.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>I have no independent evaluation of Leverett&#8217;s interpretation of Iran&#8217;s  priorities, but Leverett himself seems to suggest that the Iranians would be <em> fools <\/em>to exchange anything for such a guarantee.\u00c2\u00a0 His own report quite  confidently asserts that the US has <em>no ability<\/em> to &#8220;use force to change  the borders or form of government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.&#8221;<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>[C]oercive approaches to containing the threat of Iranian nuclearization  \tare not likely to work&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>Numerous analyses have raised serious doubts that U.S. military strikes  \tagainst Iran\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s nuclear infrastructure would delay significantly its nuclear  \tdevelopment, because of profound uncertainty about the reliability and  \tcomprehensiveness of target selection, the possibility that \u00e2\u20ac\u0153unknown\u00e2\u20ac\u009d  \tfacilities are at least as close to producing weapons-grade fissile material  \tas \u00e2\u20ac\u0153known\u00e2\u20ac\u009d facilities, and the prospect that Tehran could reconstitute its  \tnuclear program relatively rapidly.\u00c2\u00a0 At the same time, U.S. military  \taction against Iran almost certainly would have profoundly negative  \tconsequences for a range of other U.S. interests.<\/p>\n<p>There also is <strong>no reasonable basis for believing that the United States  \tcould bring about regime change in Iran<\/strong>, either by \u00e2\u20ac\u0153decapitating\u00e2\u20ac\u009d the  \tIslamic Republic\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s leadership in the course of military strikes against  \tIran\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s nuclear infrastructure or by supporting Iranian opposition groups  \tunder the cover of \u00e2\u20ac\u0153democracy promotion.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d More significantly, it is highly  \tuncertain that regime change could be effected on a strategically meaningful  \ttimetable for dealing with the nuclear threat.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Is Leverett hoping that the Iranians are unable read his own report?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Leverett&#8217;s Revelations<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Notwithstanding his own doubts about the seriousness of US threats, Leverett  is actually quite clear about the <em>specific<\/em> fears that seem to animate  Iranian concerns for a security guarantee.\u00c2\u00a0 And it is here that Leverett  seems to have publicized some things that got him in hot water with the White  House.<\/p>\n<p>Since early 2006, Leverett has been speaking publicly about US efforts to  establish back channel negotiations with the Iranians after 9\/11.\u00c2\u00a0 In a <em> New York Times<\/em> Op-Ed entitled &#8220;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2006\/01\/24\/opinion\/24leverett.html?ei=5088&#038;en=8861b5fd24f73a32&#038;ex=1295758800&#038;partner=rssnyt&#038;emc=rss&#038;pagewanted=all\">The  Gulf Between Us<\/a>,&#8221; Leverett said these diplomatic efforts were disrupted by  Bush&#8217;s &#8220;axis of evil&#8221; speech.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>In the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks, Tehran offered to help  \tWashington overthrow the Taliban and establish a new political order in  \tAfghanistan. But in his <strong>2002 State of the Union address, President Bush  \tannounced that Iran was part of an &#8220;axis of evil,&#8221; thereby scuttling any  \tpossibility of <\/strong>leveraging tactical cooperation over Afghanistan into <strong> \ta strategic opening<\/strong>.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>In his Century Foundation report, however, Leverett concedes that the State  of the Union speech was not, in fact, the deal breaker:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Iranian representatives missed the next monthly meeting with U.S.  \tdiplomats in protest [at the axis of evil speech], but\u00e2\u20ac\u201din a telling  \tindication of Tehran\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s seriousness about exploring a diplomatic opening to  \tthe United States\u00e2\u20ac\u201dresumed participation in the discussions the following  \tmonth.<\/p>\n<p>The bilateral channel on Afghanistan continued for another year, until  \tthe eve of the Iraq war, but it became clear the Bush administration was not  \tinterested in a broader, strategic dialogue with Iran. Indeed, <strong>the  \tadministration terminated the channel in May 2003<\/strong>, on the basis of  \tunproven and never pursued allegations of the involvement of Iran-based al  \tQaeda figures in the May 12, 2003, bomb attacks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>This claim is followed up by a crucial footnote:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The possibility of al Qaeda figures finding refuge in Iran was an issue  \tthat administration hardliners regularly used to undermine expanded tactical  \tcooperation between Tehran and Washington. In the course of the U.S.-Iranian  \tdialogue over Afghanistan, U.S. officials exhorted their Iranian  \tcounterparts to take steps to prevent al Qaeda and Taliban operatives from  \tseeking sanctuary in Iran. In response, Iran deployed additional security  \tforces to its border with Afghanistan and took several hundred fugitives  \tinto custody; the identities of these individuals were documented to the  \tUnited Nations. In 2002, a number of these individuals, of Afghan origin,  \twere repatriated to the new, post-Taliban Afghan government; others, of  \tSaudi origin, were repatriated to Saudi Arabia. In the same year, a group of  \tsenior al Qaeda figures managed to find their way from Afghanistan into  \tIran, most likely via longstanding smuggling and human trafficking routes  \tinto Iran\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Baluchistan province.<\/p>\n<p><strong>In response to U.S. concerns, Tehran eventually took these individuals  \tinto custody and, in the spring of 2003, offered to exchange them for a  \tsmall group of senior commanders among the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) cadres in  \tIraq<\/strong>. Even though the MEK has been designated a foreign terrorist  \torganization by the U.S. Department of State, <strong>the administration refused  \tto consider any such exchange<\/strong>.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>In other words, the deal breaker was neither Bush&#8217;s axis of evil speech <em> nor<\/em> Iranian links to al Qaeda.\u00c2\u00a0 The deal breaker, according to  Leverett&#8217;s account, was the US refusal to turn over MEK cadres in Iraq.<\/p>\n<p>I have written about the MEK in previous posts (<a href=\"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=90\">here<\/a>  and, more recently, <a href=\"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=191\">here<\/a>).<\/p>\n<p>Leverett&#8217;s central allegation is that the US drew a line in the sand by  refusing to remove the MEK &#8220;threat&#8221; to the security of the Iranian regime.\u00c2\u00a0  White House fears, notwithstanding, this story has long been part of the public  chatter.\u00c2\u00a0 David Ignatius wrote a column about the whole affair, citing  Flynt Leverett, back on July 9, 2004.<\/p>\n<p>I have no independent evaluation of the so-called &#8220;threat&#8221; posed by the MEK,  but I note with some interest that Leverett&#8217;s own account unintentional  emphasizes the fact that both the Iranians <em>and<\/em> &#8220;hardliners&#8221; in the US  seem to think the threat is a serious and valuable bargaining chip.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Who is Hitting Flynt Leverett?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Are Flynt Leverett&#8217;s White House antagonists folks who continue to hope that  the MEK can provide useful leverage for dealing with the Iranian regime?<\/p>\n<p>If so, it certainly matters who is trying to hit him.<\/p>\n<p>According to Leverett&#8217;s Century Foundation report, Cheney provides the core  of the opposition:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>A&#8230; camp, led by Vice President Dick Cheney and his most important  \tadvisers, is strongly opposed to anything resembling a grand bargain and  \tfavors a more coercive approach to Iran policy.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>This isn&#8217;t really surprising.<\/p>\n<p>But more recently Leverett has named others  when talking about White House attempts to silence him.\u00c2\u00a0 The <a href=\"http:\/\/www.latimes.com\/news\/nationworld\/world\/la-fg-censor19dec19,1,5544390.story?coll=la-headlines-world\"> <em>Los Angeles Times <\/em>reports<\/a>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Speaking to reporters Monday, Leverett speculated that senior NSC  \tofficials, such as deputy national security advisors Elliott Abrams or  \tMeghan L. O&#8217;Sullivan, had authorized their subordinates to intervene.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Mention of Elliott Abrams is no surprise.\u00c2\u00a0 No love lost there.\u00c2\u00a0 But  Meghan L. O&#8217;Sullivan is <a href=\"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=140\">no  Right Zionist<\/a>.\u00c2\u00a0 She comes to the White House via Richard Haass and the  Council on Foreign Relations.\u00c2\u00a0 Herself a target of Right Zionists, she has  solid Right Arabist credentials.<\/p>\n<p>All of which only adds to my suspicion that  the &#8220;<a href=\"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=208\">new factionalism<\/a>&#8221;  in the White House only marginal concerns the <a href=\"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=212\">demoralized Right Zionists<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>After all, the chief support for the MEK comes not from Right Zionists but from <a href=\"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=53\">Right Arabists<\/a>  including <a href=\"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=90\">James Akins<\/a>&#8211;former  US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Flynt LeverettFlynt Leverett&#8217;s views on US policy toward Iran are making news. Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett&#8211;both former NSC staff member in the Bush administration&#8211;co-authored a New York Times Op-Ed calling for a &#8220;Grand Bargain&#8221; with Iran.\u00c2\u00a0 According to the Washington Post, the CIA&#8211;under pressure from the White House&#8211;&#8220;ordered two sections concerning U.S. dealings [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[6,10,11],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/213"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=213"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/213\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=213"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=213"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=213"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}