{"id":222,"date":"2007-01-08T06:35:12","date_gmt":"2007-01-08T11:35:12","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=222"},"modified":"2007-02-27T22:02:05","modified_gmt":"2007-02-28T03:02:05","slug":"same-as-it-ever-was","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=222","title":{"rendered":"Same as It Ever Was"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><meta http-equiv=\"Content-Language\" content=\"en-us\" \/> <meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text\/html; charset=windows-1252\" \/><title>Bush<\/title>Bush&#8217;s Iraq Policy Review looks set to announce that on the political front  in Iraq there will be <em>no change<\/em>, even as the administration contemplates  a military escalation.<\/p>\n<p>After floating some <em>very radical ideas<\/em> for abandoning &#8220;national  reconciliation&#8221; and outreach to Iraqi Sunni insurgents&#8211;the so-called &#8220;<a href=\"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=200\">80  percent Solution<\/a>&#8220;&#8211;the Bush administration now appears to be ready for more  of the same.<\/p>\n<p>Robin Wright of the <em>Washington Post<\/em> <a href=\"http:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/wp-dyn\/content\/article\/2007\/01\/06\/AR2007010601489_pf.html\"> reports<\/a>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>During its two-month interagency review, the Bush administration has  \tstruggled the most to come up with proposals to jump-start the stalled  \tpolitical process in Iraq, according to U.S. officials and Western  \tdiplomats. The fate of the revised strategy will be determined as much by  \tnew movement on Iraq&#8217;s combustible political front as by success on the  \tbattlefield, administration officials said.<\/p>\n<p>But the emerging package looks slim and, <strong>absent last-minute additions,  \tappears to be more of the same<\/strong>, according to sources who have been  \tbriefed.<\/p>\n<p>The centerpiece of the political plan is the creation of <strong>a national  \treconciliation government that would bring together the two main Shiite  \tparties with the two largest Kurdish parties and the Sunni Iraqi Islamic  \tParty<\/strong>, according to Iraqi and U.S. officials. The goal is to marginalize  \tMoqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the largest and most powerful Shiite militia  \tand head of a group that has 30 seats in parliament and five cabinet posts.<\/p>\n<p>To ensure participation of Sunni moderates, the Bush administration is  \tpressing the Maliki government to take three other major steps: Amend the  \tconstitution to address Sunni concerns, pass a law on the distribution of  \tIraq&#8217;s oil revenue and change the ruling that forbids the participation of  \tformer Baath Party officials.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=164\">Been there<\/a>.\u00c2\u00a0 Done that.<\/p>\n<p>Or, more to the point: Been there.\u00c2\u00a0 Tried to do that.\u00c2\u00a0 Was <a href=\"http:\/\/www.guardian.co.uk\/worldlatest\/story\/0,,-6300409,00.html\"> blocked by Grand Ayatollah Sistani<\/a> who allegedly refused to allow the US to  marginalize Sadr.<\/p>\n<p>Little wonder, with word that the US is determined to pursue this course,  that <a href=\"http:\/\/www.alertnet.org\/thenews\/newsdesk\/MAC759981.htm\">Sadr has  gone to meet with Sistani<\/a> for clarification and confirmation of support.<\/p>\n<p>So, is the US prepared to move without the blessing of Sistani?\u00c2\u00a0 Good  luck with that.<\/p>\n<p>Meanwhile, the same old <em>political<\/em> battles will certainly accompany the  proposed escalation on the security front.<\/p>\n<p>The military brass is spoiling for a fight with Shiite militias, if not Sadr  himself.\u00c2\u00a0 Here is the <em>Washington Post <\/em>report on the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/wp-dyn\/content\/article\/2007\/01\/07\/AR2007010700444_pf.html\"> political contours of the US military surge<\/a>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>A top U.S. commander in Iraq said Sunday that <strong>previous attempts to  \thalt sectarian killings in Baghdad had failed in part because of<\/strong> a  \tshortage of Iraqi troops and <strong>a tight focus on Sunni Arab neighborhoods<\/strong>,  \tand that those lessons would be incorporated into a new strategy to slow the  \tviolence in the capital.<\/p>\n<p>Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, the number two commander in Iraq, declined  \tto discuss a proposed surge of thousands of additional U.S. and Iraqi troops  \tin Baghdad, saying he preferred to wait for President Bush to outline the  \tpolicy. But he said he <strong>wanted his forces to begin with a push against  \tboth Sunni and Shiite fighters<\/strong>&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;You have to go after both Sunni and Shia neighborhoods,&#8221; he said.  \t&#8220;Together Forward was mostly focused on Sunni neighborhoods, and we&#8217;ve got  \tto do both.&#8221;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/in.today.reuters.com\/News\/newsArticle.aspx?type=worldNews&#038;storyID=2007-01-08T023203Z_01_NOOTR_RTRJONC_0_India-282578-2.xml\"> Reuters<\/a> suggests that Odierno hedges a bit on Sadr and the Mahdi Army:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Odierno said U.S. forces would leave dealing with Sadr to Iraqi  \tauthorities. &#8220;I&#8217;m not sure we take him down,&#8221; he said.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;There are some extreme elements (of the Mehdi Army) &#8230; and we will go  \tafter them. I will allow the government to decide whether (Sadr) is part of  \tit or not. He is currently working within the political system.&#8221;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The military brass consistently emphasized <a href=\"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=189\">a split between Sadr and  his followers<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>In any event, some of Prime Minister Maliki&#8217;s aides are <a href=\"http:\/\/www.guardian.co.uk\/worldlatest\/story\/0,,-6329009,00.html\"> already throwing cold water<\/a> on Odierno&#8217;s plan for a more balanced security  crackdown in Baghdad.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Hassan al-Suneid, a key aid and member of al-Maliki&#8217;s Dawa Party, said  \tthe Iraqi leader had committed 20,000 soldiers to the operation that would  \tcall upon American troops and airpower only when needed&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>Al-Suneid, who is also a member of parliament, said the <strong>new drive to free  \tBaghdad from the grip of sectarian violence would focus initially on Sunni  \tinsurgent strongholds in western Baghdad<\/strong>.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Indeed, the Shiite appetite for a decidedly sectarian form of  counter-insurgency seems undiminished.\u00c2\u00a0 As <a href=\"http:\/\/www.sfgate.com\/cgi-bin\/article.cgi?f=\/c\/a\/2007\/01\/07\/MNG1FNEEHB1.DTL\"> Robert Collier reports<\/a> in the <em>San Francisco Chronicle<\/em>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>For their part, Shiite hard-liners also say they support reconciliation  \tefforts. But in interviews with The Chronicle, they <strong>called for U.S.  \tofficials to stop advocating the inclusion of Sunnis and to give military  \tbacking to a full-scale Shiite offensive in Sunni areas<\/strong>. These Shiites  \tdescribed their opponents as &#8220;takfiri Baathists,&#8221; combining the term for  \tSunni religious extremists with the name of Hussein&#8217;s secular-leaning party  \t&#8212; two groups that most outside observers say are often at each other&#8217;s  \tthroats.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;The American government must give the Iraqi government complete  \tsovereignty, which means that the Iraqi army will have <strong>the authority to  \tstrike the takfiri Baathists with an iron hand,<\/strong> without any interference  \tfrom the Americans,&#8221; said <strong>Hadi al-Amiri, leader of the Badr Brigade<\/strong>,  \ta Shiite militia that has been largely incorporated into the Interior  \tMinistry and, along with al-Sadr&#8217;s Mahdi Army, is widely blamed for  \tdeath-squad attacks on Sunnis.<\/p>\n<p>Many al-Sadr followers, including the Mahdi Army, appear markedly more  \tsectarian than their leader.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>As I noted in <a href=\"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=221\">a  previous post<\/a>, there are competing conceptions about the purpose of a  military &#8220;surge&#8221; in Iraq.<\/p>\n<p>The Shiite visions for Baghdad articulated in Robert Collier&#8217;s report seem to  have more in common with Reuel Marc Gerecht&#8217;s <a href=\"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=217\">views on  counter-insurgency<\/a> than with Odierno&#8217;s.<\/p>\n<p>Right Zionists like Gerecht are still looking for &#8220;victory&#8221; in Iraq.\u00c2\u00a0  [Update: <a href=\"http:\/\/www.aei.org\/publications\/filter.all,pubID.25407\/pub_detail.asp\"> new Gerecht essay<\/a> emphasizes his basis for hope, albeit not on the basis of  the path set to be adopted by the White House.]<\/p>\n<p>Odierno, not so much.\u00c2\u00a0 Reuters <a href=\"http:\/\/www.alertnet.org\/thenews\/newsdesk\/PAR748986.htm\">reports<\/a>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>U.S. Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, in charge of combat forces in  \tIraq, said on Sunday U.S. commanders had offered several recommendations and  \tsome did not involve more troops&#8230;.<\/p>\n<p>He also sought to play down U.S. public expectations of what could be  \tachieved over insurgents, saying an overwhelming &#8220;77-7&#8221; win &#8212; to use a  \tsports metaphor &#8212; &#8220;<strong>ain&#8217;t going to happen<\/strong>&#8220;.&#8221;It&#8217;s a different  \tconcept. <strong>There will be no victory parade when we leave here. There never  \twas going to be<\/strong>,&#8221; he said.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Oh.<\/p>\n<blockquote><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>BushBush&#8217;s Iraq Policy Review looks set to announce that on the political front in Iraq there will be no change, even as the administration contemplates a military escalation. After floating some very radical ideas for abandoning &#8220;national reconciliation&#8221; and outreach to Iraqi Sunni insurgents&#8211;the so-called &#8220;80 percent Solution&#8220;&#8211;the Bush administration now appears to be ready [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[3],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/222"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=222"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/222\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=222"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=222"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=222"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}