{"id":223,"date":"2007-01-09T06:58:37","date_gmt":"2007-01-09T11:58:37","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=223"},"modified":"2007-02-27T22:02:02","modified_gmt":"2007-02-28T03:02:02","slug":"pickles-and-lettuce","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=223","title":{"rendered":"Lettuce and Pickles"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><meta http-equiv=\"Content-Language\" content=\"en-us\" \/> <meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text\/html; charset=windows-1252\" \/><title>Iraqi oil is back in the news<\/title>Iraqi oil is back in the news.<\/p>\n<p>The most recent flurry of chatter was prompted by an article in the <em> Independent on Sunday<\/em> entitled, &#8220;<a href=\"http:\/\/news.independent.co.uk\/world\/middle_east\/article2132569.ece\">The  Future of Iraq: The Spoils of War<\/a>.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>The central focus of the article is on a draft hydrocarbons law that has the  Iraqi oil industry operate under production sharing agreements or PSAs that  provide very generous terms of international oil companies.<\/p>\n<p>An <a href=\"http:\/\/www.turkishdailynews.com.tr\/article.php?enewsid=63446\"> article in the <em>Turkish Daily News<\/em><\/a> suggests that the PSA terms in the  draft law will be extraordinarily generous:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>According to the Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) system to be invoked  \tby the draft, companies will have the right to retain 75 percent of their  \tannual income from Iraqi oilfields, until they match their oil production  \tcosts. After then they will be able to pocket <strong>20 percent of the annual  \tincome<\/strong>. Experts point to the fact that this is <strong>double normal market  \trates<\/strong>.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The Iraqi oil story is extremely import, but the &#8220;news&#8221; is not the PSA  system.\u00c2\u00a0 I discussed negotiations over PSA terms in a couple of October  posts (<a href=\"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=164\">here<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=165\">here<\/a>).\u00c2\u00a0 Greg  Muttittt and others made news with the PSA story back in November 2005 with a  report entitled &#8220;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.globalpolicy.org\/security\/oil\/2005\/crudedesigns.htm\">Crude  Designs<\/a>.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>The centrality of oil to US plans in Iraq cannot be overstated.\u00c2\u00a0 I have  always liked <a href=\"http:\/\/www.workingforchange.com\/article.cfm?ItemID=20106\"> Chomsky&#8217;s way of framing<\/a> that part of the story:<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p class=\"MsoNormal\">[W]e are under a rigid doctrine in the West, a  \treligious fanaticism, that says we must believe that the United States would  \thave invaded Iraq even if its main product was lettuce and pickles&#8230; Well,  \tyou know, if you have three gray cells functioning, you know that that&#8217;s  \tperfect nonsense. The U.S. invaded Iraq because it has enormous oil  \tresources, mostly untapped, and it&#8217;s right in the heart of the world&#8217;s  \tenergy system.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>The problem, however, has always been<em> and continues to be<\/em> for the Bush  administration to get the domestic Iraqi politics and <em>regional geo-politics<\/em>  aligned in such a way to get the deals done and the oil flowing.<\/p>\n<p>On this score, it should be noted that a draft law&#8211;even if adopted by the  current Iraqi parliament&#8211;does not yet constitute &#8220;success.&#8221;\u00c2\u00a0 Here is one  sober industry reaction (Simon Wardell, &#8220;Draft Oil Law: New Iraqi Law Will  Reportedly Allow Large-Scale Investment by Western Oil Majors,&#8221; <em>Global  Insight Daily Analysis<\/em>, January 8, 2007):<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>[T]he legislation is just the first of several steps which will be  \trequired before any wells are sunk. The security situation still presents a  \tmajor challenge which no major is currently willing to face. While deals may  \tbe struck, they will be contingent upon an improvement in the security  \tsituation. There will also be major risks in pouring capital into Iraq&#8217;s oil  \tsector due to the <strong>political instability<\/strong>. Even if the security picture  \timproves, <strong>governments may change, and the status of PSAs may come under  \tquestion at a later date<\/strong>, as they have in Russia. <strong>The lack of a  \tpolitical consensus in Iraq makes this risk more significant<\/strong>&#8230;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The crux of the matter is that the political stability favored, if not  required, by the Oil Majors was critically upset the day in May 2003 that the  Bush administration adopted its de-Baathification policy and thoroughly  undermined by the three major votes of 2005 that handed political power to  Iraq&#8217;s Shiites and Kurds.<\/p>\n<p>From the perspective of the foreign policy establishment, the preferred path  for political stability in Iraq was then and continues to be <a href=\"http:\/\/www.cfr.org\/publication\/7339\/benign_autocracy_is_answer_for_iraq.html?breadcrumb=\/bios\/9599\/ray_takeyh?page=5\"> benign dictatorship<\/a> under Sunni minority control.<\/p>\n<p>The proper model for a simple US oil grab is the <a href=\"http:\/\/money.cnn.com\/magazines\/fortune\/fortune_archive\/2004\/06\/28\/374397\/index.htm\"> Libya deal<\/a>, not Iraq.\u00c2\u00a0 Saddamism without Saddam.<\/p>\n<p>So the Bush administration has been scrambling to construct some kind of  political stability, not only within Iraq but within the region, that would  allow the oil to flow.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The News from Kurdistan<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>One key sticking point has been the locus of control over new oil field  development within Iraq.\u00c2\u00a0 In other words, who gets to <em>sign the contracts<\/em>?<\/p>\n<p>The Kurds have always hoped to win control for the Kurdish Regional  Government in northern Iraq&#8211;and to include the oil-rich city of Kirkuk within  that regional entity.<\/p>\n<p>The news of an oil &#8220;breakthrough&#8221; in Iraq is mostly on the Kurdish front.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=205\">Shiite forces<\/a>  abanonded the Kurds on this issue.<\/p>\n<p>Now, the Kurds appear to have conceded the point.<\/p>\n<p>In late December 2006, the <em> <a href=\"http:\/\/www.kurdishglobe.net\/displayArticle.jsp?id=1C9F300282D0113D9656B27BCA5A1BAC\"> Kurdish Globe<\/a><\/em> reported:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Oil has been a major issue dividing Kurdish and Iraqi authorities in  \tpost-war Iraq. KRG says it is constitutionally allowed to drill for oil in  \tareas under its control, but Iraqi oil officials have threatened that KRG&#8217;s  \toil deals will not be &#8220;valid.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;<strong>Most of the oil wells are in southern Iraq<\/strong>, and the oil law allows  \tKRG to talk with companies and make deals for oil production,&#8221; [Kurdistan  \tRegional Government Prime Minister Nechirvan] Barzani said&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>According to <strong>preliminary agreements between the KRG and federal  \tauthorities, a representative from the Baghdad government will attend talks  \tbetween the KRG and oil firms<\/strong>. Once the KRG reaches a deal with a  \tcompany to drill for oil in Kurdistan, the <strong>contract will be sent to  \tBaghdad for assessment and approval by an Iraqi government committee<\/strong>.  \tThe contract will then be returned to the KRG and it will have 60 days to  \tsign it&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;There needs to be some criteria according to which the (oil) contracts are  \tinvestigated so as to know if there is any corruption in the deals or to  \twhat extent the company will implement its obligations,&#8221; Barzani said.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Note well: this is Barzani&#8217;s concession speech and it will not likely be  greeted with thunderous applause in Kurdistan.\u00c2\u00a0 Barzani&#8217;s two  justifications for centralized control&#8211;that most of the wells are in southern  Iraq (and therefore a source of wealth for Kurds only under centralization) and  that central authorities need to be able to investigate corruption&#8211;are very  thin fig leaves, given the history of Kurdish demands for autonomy.\u00c2\u00a0 Look  for an internal Kurdish split that would challenge Barzani for &#8220;selling out&#8221; the  Kurds.<\/p>\n<p>The Kurdish concession has regional implications insofar as Turkey has been  firm in its opposition to Kurdish autonomy.\u00c2\u00a0 Indeed, just as the Kurds were  conceding the point, Kirkuk <a href=\"http:\/\/www.menafn.com\/qn_news_story_s.asp?StoryId=1093137251\">oil began  to flow<\/a> in the pipeline to Turkey&#8217;s port of Ceyhan.\u00c2\u00a0 Perhaps it is no  coincidence.<\/p>\n<p>Note, too, that the future of Kurdish control of Kirkuk also looks  increasingly fragile, with John McCain now leading a campaign to <a href=\"http:\/\/www.aina.org\/news\/20070107152240.htm\">delay a referendum<\/a> on  Kirkuk that would likely establish Kurdish control of the city.<\/p>\n<p>In the last instance, these Kurdish concessions are part of a larger campaign  to restore centralized national political control in Iraq.<\/p>\n<p>On the oil front, centralization is likely intended to appease Sunni  rejectionists.\u00c2\u00a0 It will also please Muqtada al-Sadr who is <a href=\"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=45\">a strident critic of  Kurdish control of Kirkuk<\/a> and of decentralization, more generally.\u00c2\u00a0 Is  Sadr willing to trade privatization (i.e., production sharing agreements) for  centralization?<\/p>\n<p>If so, then the US will have effectively exploited the threat of Kurdish  regional PSAs to extract comparable concessions from Iraqi nationalists.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Iraqi oil is back in the newsIraqi oil is back in the news. The most recent flurry of chatter was prompted by an article in the Independent on Sunday entitled, &#8220;The Future of Iraq: The Spoils of War.&#8221; The central focus of the article is on a draft hydrocarbons law that has the Iraqi oil [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[3],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/223"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=223"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/223\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=223"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=223"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=223"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}