{"id":230,"date":"2007-01-23T06:48:47","date_gmt":"2007-01-23T11:48:47","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=230"},"modified":"2007-02-27T22:01:12","modified_gmt":"2007-02-28T03:01:12","slug":"we-need-some-leverage","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=230","title":{"rendered":"&#8220;We Need Some Leverage&#8221;"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><meta http-equiv=\"Content-Language\" content=\"en-us\" \/> <meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text\/html; charset=windows-1252\" \/><title>When tracing US policy toward Ir<\/title>When tracing US policy toward Iran, keep one eye on the aircraft carrier  groups and one eye on the gas pump.<\/p>\n<p>Last week, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates had <a href=\"http:\/\/www.guardian.co.uk\/worldlatest\/story\/0,,-6355121,00.html\">this  to say<\/a> about Iran:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Gates said he had told the leaders of U.S. allies Saudi Arabia and Qatar  \tthat the Iranians &#8220;believe they have the United States at some disadvantage  \tbecause of the situation in Iraq.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;To be precise, I told them both that I thought the Iranians were  \toverplaying their hand and that one of the consequences of that is that they  \thave raised real concerns on the part of a number of countries in the region  \tand beyond about their intentions,&#8221; he told reporters&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>With regard to U.S. failure thus far to achieve stability in Iraq, Gates  \tsaid, &#8220;<strong>I think that our difficulties have given them (the Iranians) a  \ttactical opportunity in the short term<\/strong>, but the United States is a very  \tpowerful country.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Asked about the prospects for military conflict with Iran, whose nuclear  \tprogram is seen by the Bush administration as a growing threat to U.S.  \tinterests, Gates said, &#8220;There are many courses of action available that do \t<strong>not<\/strong> involve <strong>an open conflict with Iran &#8211; there&#8217;s no need for that<\/strong>.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Gates said that although he had publicly advocated negotiating with Iran as  \trecently as 2004, he now advises against that.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;<strong>Right at this moment, there&#8217;s really nothing the Iranians want from us<\/strong>,&#8221;  \the said. &#8220;And so, in any negotiation right now <strong>we would be the  \tsupplicant<\/strong>,&#8221; asking Iran to stop doing such things as enriching uranium  \tfor its nuclear program.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;<strong>We need some leverage, it seems to me<\/strong>, before we engage with the  \tIranians,&#8221; Gates added.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Gates has come around to the Caspar Weinberger school of dealing with Iran.\u00c2\u00a0  In the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.cfr.org\/content\/publications\/attachments\/Iran_TF.pdf\"> 2004 report of the Council on Foreign Relations Iran Task Force<\/a> that Gates  co-chaired with Zbigniew Brzezinski, the proposal to engage Iran prompted  Weinberger prot\u00c3\u00a9g\u00c3\u00a9 and Task Force member Frank Carlucci to offer a &#8220;dissenting  view&#8221; (published as part of the report, page 49):<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>While I agree with the main thrust of the report I do not agree that the  \tU.S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan may offer Iran new incentives to  \topen a mutually beneficial dialogue. On the contrary, I believe Iran has few  \tincentives for dialogue. They are convinced we intend to overthrow them, and \t<strong>they believe we are bogged down in Iraq and have lost what support we had  \tin the Arab world<\/strong>. From their perspective, it is better to wait and let  \tus stew in our own juice. <strong>Overtures on our part, under these  \tcircumstances, are likely to be interpreted as a sign of weakness<\/strong>&#8230;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Hence, the Gates quest for &#8220;some leverage.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p><strong>Floating Leverage<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Sometimes leverage comes in the form of <a href=\"http:\/\/www.guardian.co.uk\/worldlatest\/story\/0,,-6349653,00.html\"> aircraft carriers like the USS John C. Stennis<\/a>.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The deployment of the USS John C. Stennis to the Middle East will put two  \tU.S. aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf region for the first time since  \tthe 2003 Iraq invasion, in a clear response to Iran&#8217;s aggressive posture in  \tthe region&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;This demonstrates our resolve to do what we can to bring security and  \tstability to the region,&#8221; Cmdr. Kevin Aandahl of the U.S. Navy&#8217;s Fifth  \tFleet in Bahrain said Tuesday&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>A second U.S. carrier will significantly boost U.S. air power in the region  \tand serve to remind Iran of American firepower. Its arrival will give the  \tPentagon two carriers in the region for the first time since 2003, Aandahl  \tsaid.<\/p>\n<p>After departing Tuesday from its homeport of Bremerton, Wash., the Stennis  \twill stop in San Diego to pick up an air wing of more than 80 planes,  \tincluding F\/A-18 Hornet and Superhornet fighter-bombers, the Navy said&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>The Stennis and its 3,200 sailors lead a strike group consisting of the  \tguided-missile cruiser USS Antietam, three Navy destroyers &#8211; the USS O&#8217;Kane,  \tPreble and Paul Hamilton &#8211; the submarine USS Key West, the guided-missile  \tfrigate USS Rentz, as well as the supply ship USNS Bridge, the Navy said.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><strong>Diplomatic Dead Ends<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>In addition to the naval buildup in the Gulf&#8211;and the troop surge in  Iraq&#8211;there are the more &#8220;diplomatic&#8221; forms of leverage.<\/p>\n<p>Columnist Jim Hoagland of the <em>Washington Post<\/em> <a href=\"http:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/wp-dyn\/content\/article\/2007\/01\/19\/AR2007011901497.html\"> reports<\/a> that the search for leverage will not focus on the United Nations:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>While Rice was traveling in the Middle East and Europe last week,  \tAmerican allies were being told that <strong>Washington would not seek new and  \ttougher Security Council sanctions against Iran<\/strong>, as has been widely  \texpected&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>Russia&#8217;s unexpectedly strong opposition even to weak sanctions adopted  \tonly after months of debate has deepened Bush&#8217;s <strong>growing disillusionment  \twith President Vladimir Putin<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<p>The American leader is determined not to get caught in &#8220;a dead end&#8221; at  \tthe United Nations, according to U.S. officials.\u00c2\u00a0 Bush is said to feel  \tthat Putin went back on personal pledges to support meaningful U.N. action  \tin return for Bush&#8217;s committing to diplomatic efforts last June.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><strong>Petro Leverage<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>According to Hoagland, the key plan for developing &#8220;leverage&#8221; in the Gulf  depends on the Saudis and oil leverage.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Instead of returning to the United Nations for a new resolution, the  \tadministration has launched a broad effort to assemble an economic coalition  \tof the willing to confront Iran. Trade, investment and the price of oil are  \tthe primary targets Washington chose for this coalition.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The idea of trade and investment &#8220;sanctions&#8221; have long been <a href=\"http:\/\/www.meforum.org\/article\/1068\">championed by Patrick Clawson<\/a>  of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.<\/p>\n<p>But the oil leverage is the central strategic element in the new &#8220;campaign&#8221;  for leverage.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The campaign received a big boost last week when it became clear that <strong> \tSaudi Arabia is finally worried enough about Iran to use oil as a weapon  \tagainst the regime of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad<\/strong>. Saudi oil minister  \tAli Nuaimi publicly opposed Iranian calls for production cuts by the OPEC  \tcartel to halt a decline that has taken crude oil from $78 a barrel in July  \tto just above $50 a barrel last week.<\/p>\n<p>The Saudis have enough reserve production capacity to swing OPEC prices  \tup and down at will. Their relatively small population gives them a  \tflexibility in postponing revenue gains that populous Iran lacks. Nuaimi&#8217;s  \tpronouncement, although cast as a technical matter that had nothing to do  \twith politics, seemed to <strong>give teeth to recent warnings issued in private  \tby Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi national security adviser, that the  \tkingdom will now respond to Iranian hostility with its own confrontational  \ttactics<\/strong>.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>High oil\u00c2\u00a0 prices have always benefited Iranian leverage in the region.\u00c2\u00a0  Saudi leverage has always stemmed from its ability to flood the market and wait  for other oil exporting countries to cry uncle.<\/p>\n<p>The role of Bandar in this campaign is crucial because it goes to the heart  of a long-term factional fight within the House of Saud, as Hoagland well  understands.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Divisions within the Saudi royal family over how to handle Iran also  \tshould be handled with care, not bluster, by Washington.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Recall that the divisions within the Saudi royal family <a href=\"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=197\">recently surfaced<\/a> in  late November with the publication of <a href=\"http:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/wp-dyn\/content\/article\/2006\/11\/28\/AR2006112801277.html\"> an op-ed by Nawaf Obaid<\/a>.\u00c2\u00a0 Obaid explicitly endorsed the oil threat and  seemed to claim to speak for Bandar:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Major Saudi tribal confederations, which have extremely close historical  \tand communal ties with their counterparts in Iraq, are demanding action.  \tThey are supported by <strong>a new generation of Saudi royals in strategic  \tgovernment positions who are eager to see the kingdom play a more muscular  \trole in the region<\/strong>&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>[Saudi King] Abdullah may decide to strangle Iranian funding of the  \tmilitias through oil policy. If Saudi Arabia boosted production and cut the  \tprice of oil in half, the kingdom could still finance its current spending.  \tBut it would be <strong>devastating to Iran, which is facing economic  \tdifficulties even with today&#8217;s high prices<\/strong>. The result would be to limit  \tTehran&#8217;s ability to continue funneling hundreds of millions each year to  \tShiite militias in Iraq and elsewhere.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Until recently, King Abdullah and oil minister Ali Nuaimi (also, Ali Naimi)  have been seen as supporting the oil price spike.\u00c2\u00a0 But Naimi, in  particular, might have been &#8220;moved&#8221; by <a href=\"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=226\">recent chatter about a  cabinet shuffle<\/a> that would remove him from the oil ministry.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Iranian Endgame<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Perhaps the goal, in this quest for leverage, is to establish the  preconditions for engagement with the regime.<\/p>\n<p>For now, the folks like Richard Perle, still hoping that US leverage would be  used to destabilize the regime itself, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.ynetnews.com\/articles\/0,7340,L-3355234,00.html\">appear  frustrated<\/a> with the Bush administration.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Perle expressed astonishment at the lack of support granted by the West  \tto Iranian opposition movements who wish to overthrow the regime of the  \tAyatollahs.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;I&#8217;m not convinced that we have a lot of time. Given the peril that would  \tresult, <strong>its astonishing to me that we do not now have a serious political  \tstrategy with Iran<\/strong>,&#8221; he said, adding he thought regime change is &#8220;the  \tonly significant effective way&#8221; to deal with the Iranian threat.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;If we continue on our current course, we have only a military option. So <strong> \twhat I&#8217;m urging, and this should have happened a very long time ago, is that  \twe make a serious effort to work with the internal (Iranian) opposition<\/strong>,&#8221;  \tPerle said.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Any &#8220;leverage&#8221; that Gates can find may make Perle&#8217;s case for him.\u00c2\u00a0 The  internal opposition is showing some early signs of <a href=\"http:\/\/www.guardian.co.uk\/worldlatest\/story\/0,,-6363083,00.html\"> renewed activity<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>[UPDATE: those hoping to exacerbate tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran  can only be pleased by <a href=\"http:\/\/today.reuters.com\/news\/articlenews.aspx?type=topNews&#038;storyID=2007-01-23T153838Z_01_L23452825_RTRUKOC_0_US-LEBANON-GOVERNMENT.xml\"> the confrontation playing out on the streets of Lebanon<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>The clash over Lebanon may represent one locus of disagreement within the  Saudi royal family.\u00c2\u00a0 <a href=\"http:\/\/english.people.com.cn\/200701\/04\/eng20070104_338236.html\">Saudi  King Abdullah<\/a> and <a href=\"http:\/\/www.kuna.net.kw\/home\/story.aspx?Language=en&#038;DSNO=939978\">Foreign  Minister Saud al-Faisal<\/a> have both worked hard to heal the breach between  Hezbollah and the Saudi-backed Hariri\/Siniora crowd in Lebanon.\u00c2\u00a0 Meanwhile,  over at the <em>Telegraph <\/em> <a href=\"http:\/\/www.telegraph.co.uk\/news\/main.jhtml?xml=\/news\/2007\/01\/10\/wleb10.xml\"> Bandar is mentioned<\/a> as a link between the Saudis and CIA efforts to  undermine Hezbollah.]<\/p>\n<blockquote><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>When tracing US policy toward IrWhen tracing US policy toward Iran, keep one eye on the aircraft carrier groups and one eye on the gas pump. Last week, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates had this to say about Iran: Gates said he had told the leaders of U.S. allies Saudi Arabia and Qatar that the [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[6,3,8],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/230"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=230"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/230\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=230"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=230"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=230"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}