{"id":312,"date":"2007-07-09T14:43:56","date_gmt":"2007-07-09T18:43:56","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=312"},"modified":"2007-07-09T14:43:56","modified_gmt":"2007-07-09T18:43:56","slug":"beyond-the-surge-the-right-arabist-case-against-maliki","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=312","title":{"rendered":"Beyond the Surge: The Right Arabist Case Against Maliki"},"content":{"rendered":"
For much of the foreign policy e<\/title>For much of the foreign policy establishment in Washington, the “military front” has never really been the central battlefield in Iraq.\u00c2\u00a0 Instead, the paramount issue has always been the “political front”–the composition of political power within Iraq and the regional balance of power in the Gulf.<\/p>\n<p>As I have <a href=\"http:\/\/www.zmag.org\/content\/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=10185\"> previously argued<\/a>, the “political front” is dominated by a split in Washington between <em>Right Arabists <\/em>who see Sunni Arab rule in Iraq and the key to the policing of US imperial interests in the Gulf and<em> Right Zionists <\/em>who see Iraqi Shiite power as the key to a strategic re-alignment that envisions an alliance between the US, Israel, Iraq, and [a politically reconstructed] Iran.<\/p>\n<p>[On the political “reconstruction” of what he calls “<a href=\"http:\/\/www.nationalreview.com\/interrogatory\/rubin200604250606.asp\">Eternal Iran<\/a>“, Right Zionist Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute has <a href=\"http:\/\/www.aei.org\/publications\/filter.all,pubID.26420\/pub_detail.asp\"> recently suggested<\/a>, “The real danger isn’t Iran’s bomb, however, but the regime that would wield it.]<\/p>\n<p>As I have previously noted (<a href=\"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=274\">here<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=279\">here<\/a>), Right Zionists are quite committed to the Shiite government in Iraq.\u00c2\u00a0 They see in Iraqi Shiites a more or less adequate <em>proxy<\/em> for US power.<\/p>\n<p>By contrast, Right Arabists have <a href=\"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=305\">never stopped lamenting<\/a> the end of Sunni Arab minority rule in Iraq.<\/p>\n<p>Both of these two camps, however, focus on the centrality of <em>political proxies<\/em> for US power.<\/p>\n<p>Meanwhile, the “surge” tends to look a little different.<\/p>\n<p>The key figures behind the idea of the “surge” are figures best described as “<a href=\"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=134\">Unipolarists<\/a>” who tend to be far <em>less<\/em> focused on indirect rule through political proxies because they are much <em>more<\/em> committed–unapologetically so–to the widespread, direct application of US military force (aka “<a href=\"http:\/\/www.opinionjournal.com\/editorial\/feature.html?id=110002840\">hard Wilsonianism<\/a>” or, more simply, “<a href=\"http:\/\/www.usatoday.com\/news\/opinion\/editorials\/2003-05-05-boot_x.htm\">imperialism<\/a>“).<\/p>\n<p>The leading Unipolarists include key architects of the “surge,” <a href=\"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=169\">William Kristol<\/a> and <a href=\"http:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/wp-dyn\/content\/article\/2006\/12\/26\/AR2006122600773_pf.html\"> Frederick Kagan<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>And here is a key to understanding the politics of the surge: the Bush administration has not traditionally been dominated by Unipolarists (hence all the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.aei.org\/publications\/pubID.25126,filter.all\/pub_detail.asp\"> Unipolarist attacks on Rumsfeld<\/a>) and the Unipolarists, in turn, have <em> always<\/em> been closer to John McCain than to George W. Bush.<\/p>\n<p>Frederick Kagan’s <a href=\"http:\/\/www.aei.org\/publications\/filter.all,pubID.26434\/pub_detail.asp\"> latest missive<\/a> from his perch at the American Enterprise Institute speaks to the centrality of military power in the 2007 “surge” and marks some differences that make the Unipolarist faith in military power distinct from the quest for “political proxies” that animates both Right Zionists and Right Arabists.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>A number of clear lessons drawn from these operations have informed the \tcurrent strategy. First, political progress by itself will not reduce the \tviolence. From May 2003 through mid-2006, the Bush administration and the \tmilitary command focused on political progress as the key. The transfer of \tsovereignty in mid-2004, the election of a Transitional National Assembly in \tJanuary 2005, the approval of a new constitution by referendum in October \t2005, and the election of a fresh National Assembly in December 2005… \tthroughout this period, American armed forces tried to stay in the \tbackground, keeping their “footprint” minimal and pushing the nascent Iraqi \tSecurity Forces into the lead….<\/p>\n<p>Political progress and political solutions are essential to ultimate \tsuccess in counterinsurgency, but they must often be complemented by major \tmilitary operations sustained over a long time.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>At the same time, it must be acknowledged that when he <em>does<\/em> consider the “political front” Kagan appears to be much closer to the Right Arabist position than some of his colleagues at the American Enterprise Institute, <em> especially<\/em> Reuel Marc Gerecht.<\/p>\n<p>Gerecht favors ruthless counter-insurgency efforts targeting the ex-Baathist Sunni insurgency, even as he <a href=\"http:\/\/www.aei.org\/publications\/pubID.25344\/pub_detail.asp\">warns against<\/a> a frontal assault on Moqtada al-Sadr.<\/p>\n<p>Kagan’s “<a href=\"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/?p=310\">Anbar Model<\/a>,” by contrast, seeks to woo the ex-Baathist Sunni insurgency while reserving US firepower for al-Qaeda and Sadrists forces.\u00c2\u00a0 From <a href=\"http:\/\/www.aei.org\/publications\/filter.all,pubID.26434\/pub_detail.asp\"> Kagan’s latest<\/a> defense of the “surge” names its targets quite carefully:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The new strategy for Iraq has entered its second phase. Now that all of \tthe additional combat forces have arrived in theater, Generals David \tPetraeus and Ray Odierno have begun Operation Phantom Thunder, a vast and \tcomplex effort to <strong>disrupt al Qaeda and Shiite militia bases<\/strong> all \taround Baghdad in advance of the major clear-and-hold operations that will \tfollow. The deployment of forces and preparations for this operation have \tgone better than expected, and Phantom Thunder is so far proceeding very \twell.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>No mention of targeting the ex-Baathis Sunni insurgency.\u00c2\u00a0 No mystery why.\u00c2\u00a0 Kagan considers them his new best friends.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>As the new strategy of 2007 took hold, U.S. forces found that they could \teven negotiate and work with some of their most determined former foes in \tthe Sunni Arab insurgency–groups like the Baathist 1920s Brigades that once \tfocused on killing Americans and now are increasingly working with Americans \tto kill al Qaeda fighters. Coalition operations in Anbar, which looked \thopeless for years, have accomplished extraordinary successes that are \tdeepening and spreading.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Kagan’s surge has seemingly come under attack from within the Republican Party, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2007\/07\/09\/washington\/09prexy.html?_r=1&hp=&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&adxnnlx=1183972672-IAZ5D8RldcF09uInwsj2xA\"> allegedly prompting soul-searching and debate at the White House<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Much of this turmoil appears linked to the late June “defection” of <a href=\"http:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/wp-dyn\/content\/article\/2007\/06\/26\/AR2007062600286.html\"> Senator Richard Lugar<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Lugar takes some shots at the military surge.\u00c2\u00a0 But he has hardly become an advocate of US withdrawal.<\/p>\n<p>Instead, a closer look at the <a href=\"http:\/\/lugar.senate.gov\/record.cfm?id=277751&\">Senate speech<\/a> that prompted all the buzz about Republican defections suggests that Lugar’s central focus was on the <em>political front<\/em>, specifically his dissatisfaction with the Shiite government of Nouri al-Maliki.<\/p>\n<p>The speech is a classic <em>Right Arabist<\/em> manifesto–hawkish on Iran, soft on Sunni Arab regimes and highly critical of Shiite rule in Iraq.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>I believe that we do have viable options that could strengthen our \tposition in the Middle East… But seizing these opportunities will require \tthe President to downsize the U.S. military\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s role in Iraq… It will also \trequire members of Congress to be receptive to overtures by the President to \tconstruct a new policy outside the binary choice of surge versus \twithdrawal…<\/p>\n<p>We should attempt to preserve initiatives that have shown promise, such as \tengaging Sunni groups that are disaffected with the extreme tactics and \tagenda of Al Qaeda in Iraq. But three factors \u00e2\u20ac\u201c the political fragmentation \tin Iraq, the growing stress on our military, and the constraints of our own \tdomestic political process — are converging to make it almost impossible \tfor the United States to engineer a stable, multi-sectarian government in \tIraq in a reasonable time frame….<\/p>\n<p>The Shia-led government is going out of its way to bottle up money budgeted \tfor Sunni provinces… food rations are not being delivered to Sunni towns. \tIraqi leaders have resisted de-Baathification reform, the conclusion of an \toil law, and effective measures to prevent oil smuggling and other corrupt \tpractices…<\/p>\n<p>[W]e are continuing to pour our treasure and manpower into the narrow and \tuncertain pursuit of creating a stable, <strong>democratic, pluralist society in \tIraq<\/strong>. This pursuit has been the focal point of the Bush Administration\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s \tMiddle East policy. Unfortunately, <strong>this objective is not one on which our \tfuture in the region can rest<\/strong>, especially when far more important goals \trelated to Middle East security are languishing. I am not suggesting that \twhat happens in Iraq is not important, but the Bush Administration must \tavoid becoming so quixotic in its attempt to achieve its optimum forecasts \tfor Iraq that it misses other opportunities to protect our vital interests \tin the Middle East…<\/p>\n<p>[W]e have an interest in preventing Iranian domination of the region.\u00c2\u00a0The \tfall of Saddam Hussein\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Sunni government opened up opportunities for Iran \tto seek much greater influence in Iraq and in the broader Middle East. \u00c2\u00a0An \taggressive Iran would pose serious challenges for Saudi Arabia, Jordan, \tEgypt, and other Arab governments.\u00c2\u00a0Iran is pressing a broad agenda in the \tMiddle East with uncertain consequences for weapons proliferation, \tterrorism, the security of Israel, and other U.S. interests.\u00c2\u00a0Any course we \tadopt should consider how it would impact the regional influence of Iran….<\/p>\n<p>In my judgment, the current surge strategy is not an effective means of \tprotecting these interests. Its prospects for success are too dependent on \tthe actions of others who do not share our agenda…<\/p>\n<p>A total withdrawal from Iraq also fails to meet our security interests. \tSuch a withdrawal would compound the risks of a wider regional conflict \tstimulated by Sunni-Shia tensions…<\/p>\n<p>Most regional governments are extremely wary of U.S. abandonment of the \tMiddle East. Moderate states are concerned by Iran\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s aggressiveness and by \tthe possibility of sectarian conflict beyond Iraq\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s borders. They recognize \tthat the United States is an indispensable counterweight to Iran and a \tsource of stability. The United States should continue to organize regional \tplayers \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, the Gulf States, and others \u00e2\u20ac\u201c \tbehind a program of containing Iran\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s disruptive agenda in the region.<\/p>\n<p>Such a re-alignment has relevance for stabilizing Iraq…<\/p>\n<p>The United States should make clear to our Arab friends that they have a \trole in promoting reconciliation within Iraq, preventing oil price spikes, \tsplitting Syria from Iran, and demonstrating a more united front against \tterrorism.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Lugar is a good Republican and he knows that the surge in US casualties will be costly for his party:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Some will argue that political timelines should always be subordinated to \tmilitary necessity, but that is unrealistic in a democracy. Many political \tobservers contend that voter dissatisfaction in 2006 with Administration \tpolicies in Iraq was the major factor in producing new Democratic Party \tmajorities in both Houses of Congress. Domestic politics routinely intrude \ton diplomatic and military decisions. The key is to manage these intrusions \tso that we avoid actions that are not in our national interest….<\/p>\n<p>[D]omestic pressure for withdrawal will continue to be intense. A course \tchange should happen now.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>But the primary emphasis of any “course change” is not military, but political: the end of the road for the Maliki government and Shiite political dominance.<\/p>\n<p>Will the Bush administration turn against Maliki?<\/p>\n<p>To some extent, that probably depends on his <a href=\"http:\/\/www.latimes.com\/news\/printedition\/asection\/la-fg-iraq5jul05,1,6835629.story?coll=la-news-a_section\"> <em>ability<\/em> to move the hydrocarbon “framework” legislation through parliament<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>In the current political context, however, the Sunni political establishment has made a stand <a href=\"http:\/\/www.alertnet.org\/thenews\/newsdesk\/KHA742545.htm\"><em>against<\/em> “foreign” control of Iraqi oil<\/a>.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>A member of Iraq’s parliamentary energy committee quit on Saturday in \tprotest over a draft oil law…<\/p>\n<p>Usama al-Nujeyfi told a small news conference that the proposal would cede \ttoo much control to global companies and “ruin the country’s future”. He \tvowed to work to defeat the draft in parliament.<\/p>\n<p>“I announce my resignation and distance myself from delivering this draft \tbefore this parliament and I will carry out my obligation to repeal it \tinside parliament with all fellow nationalists,” al-Nujeyfi said….<\/p>\n<p>[A]l-Nujeyfi, a Sunni member of the Iraq National List, headed by secular \tpolitician and former interim prime minister Iyad Allawi, said the proposal \twould cede too much to foreign firms eager to rebuild Iraq’s oil industry.<\/p>\n<p>“I call on my lawmaker brothers and sisters to confront this law which will \truin the country’s future and will be in the interest of large global \tcompanies at the expense of Iraqis,” he said.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Perhaps, as <a href=\"http:\/\/truth-about-iraqis2.blogspot.com\/2007\/07\/i-am-getting-dozens-of-reports-from.html\"> some have suggested<\/a>, Right Arabists will successfully convince the White House to dump Maliki and install ex-Baathist Iyad Allawi as a new Iraqi “strongman.”<\/p>\n<p>I tend to doubt it.<\/p>\n<p>But if Sunni opposition to the hydrocarbon law continues much longer, it may prove very awkward when the US subsequently demands that Allawi impose legislation that his allies once decried as a measure designed “in the interest of large global companies at the expense of Iraqis.”<\/p>\n<blockquote><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>For much of the foreign policy eFor much of the foreign policy establishment in Washington, the “military front” has never really been the central battlefield in Iraq.\u00c2\u00a0 Instead, the paramount issue has always been the “political front”–the composition of political power within Iraq and the regional balance of power in the Gulf. As I have […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[3,10,11,18],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/312"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=312"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/312\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=312"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=312"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/profcutler.com\/wordpress_blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=312"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}