In looking at Washington’s political inclinations in post-Saddam Iraq, I have argued for a factional interpretation that pits Right Arabists (so-called Realists) against Right Zionists (so-called Neocons). If, at first, the US moved aggressively to empower Iraqi Shiites and undermine the political power of Iraq’s Sunni minority, I suggested that this should be coded as a victory for Right Zionists. I still hold to that view.<\/p>\n
At least as early as September 2003, however, there seemed to be signs of a serious effort by Right Arabists to win back control of US policy in Iraq. One popular marker was the decision to bring in Robert Blackwill to run the Iraq Stabilization Group, viewed at the time as an attempt to marginalize Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and his Right Zionist deputies. One of the great observers of this process–the alleged eclipse of the Neocons and rally of the Realists–has been Jim Lobe<\/a> who has been tracking the details of the story without fail for several years now.<\/p>\n I offer, for your consideration, however, a modest–less factional–interpretation of Bush administration policy that, if plausible, would indicate no real loss of influence for Right Zionists. The source of this analysis is Vali Nasr, on the occasion of his being named the newest adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.<\/p>\n I have posted below some extended excerpts of Nasr’s March 26, 2006 remarks<\/a> (how much, if anything, has changed since these remarks were made?) about Iran, Iraq, and Arab regional hegemony. Let’s start, however, with the key “less factional” amendment to the usual analysis of US policy in Iraq.<\/p>\n ultimately there are winners and there are losers out of Iraq, not only in Iraq, but across the region. The Shi\u00e2\u20ac\u2122as won and the Kurds won, and the Sunnis lost. And if Iraq continues, ultimately when there\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s a balance, for Shi\u00e2\u20ac\u2122as the glass will be half full, and for the Sunnis the glass will be half empty. And the U.S. <\/strong>has tried to sort of\u00e2\u20ac\u201dhas been trying to give the Sunnis, if you would, a soft landing, at the same time as it\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s\u00e2\u20ac\u201din Iraq it\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s trying to hold the hand of the Shi\u00e2\u20ac\u2122as being ascendent…<\/strong><\/p>\n But at some point, we\u00e2\u20ac\u2122re not going to be able to do this, and actually, we\u00e2\u20ac\u2122re reaching that point, that ultimately in Iraq, and then across the region, there is going to be a winner and a loser. And there is an enormous amount of effort, particularly by regional leaders, to try to influence Washington in this regard. <\/strong>I mean here, for instance, in the council, I think when last year the Saudi foreign minister essentially called for the U.S. to change its tactics and be much more amenable to Sunnis is indicative of that.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Has US Ambassador Khalilzad been trying to close<\/strong> “pandora’s box” (re-Baathification, curbing Shiite influence, etc.) and reverse<\/strong> US policy in Iraq? Or is he merely trying to provide a “soft landing” to Sunnis in the region, even as the Right Zionist tilt toward the Shia<\/a> proceeds as planned?<\/p>\n